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Summary  findings
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if it has access  to credit the household  will achieve  lower  land.
returns  than an educated  household.  The net marginal  benefit  of irrigation  increases
If, as is common,  the income-poor  are less  educated  strongly  with  the education  of a household.
because  of failures  in the credit market and because  they  The results  suggest  that unless  disparities  in education
live  in areas  where there is less  access  to schooling,  then  are addressed,  market-oriented  reforms  will generate
the poor will also have  lower returns on investments.  inequitable  agricultural  growth in Vietnam.
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It is often argued  that the poor, and poorly educated,  have less access to credit for
financing  investment. This is known  to have important  implications  for understanding  the
interaction between distribution and  growth.'  The  more  poor  (and  hence  credit
constrained)  people  there are, the lower  the rate of growth,  and the more likely  poverty will
persist. Relaxing  credit  market  constraints  is then seen to be key to equitable  investment.
However,  could it also be that the poor, and poorly educated,  face lower rates of
return to given investments? This may reflect other market failures, such as in land and
labor markets. Credit market failure may then be only part of the problem of persistent
poverty. The question  also has bearing  on the likely  quality of the future growth  process.
With market-oriented  reforms,  resources  will tend to flow to households  with higher rates
of return to investment. If these are the non-poor,  then an inequitable  growth process will
result.  By contrast, if in fact the poor get higher returns, growth  promoting reforms will
tend to be inequality  reducing.
An argument as to why we might expect the poor to obtain lower returns to
investment can be  sketched as  follows.  In poor, rural, developing economies_and
especially those undergoing transition to  a market economy_farm-households appear
often to be severely  constrained  in pursuing  investment  opportunities. Underdeveloped  or
missing labor markets are also common  in such settings. A poorly educated  family living
in a poor remote rural area cannot  easily hire the services  of a well educated  worker, who
could allow  the family  to get the most out of new technology,  even  when credit  is available
to finance the investments  required. Typically  such economies  are also characterized  by
considerable  disparities  in educational  attainments,  correlated  with poverty. This may well
reflect credit market failures, but it also arises from the cost of geographic  mobility and
inequality  in access to schools.  Both schooling  levels and market  development  are likely  to
also vary regionally.
For a survey  of the  theoretical  arguments,  see  Aghion  et al. (1999).
1In settings such as these, returns to physical investments will naturally depend on
human capital endowments at the family level.  More educated households are more likely
to draw advantage from opportunities afforded them through investments.  By this view,
what distinguishes the poor, rural, transition economy is the fact that even if a household
could afford to hire skilled labor to make up for its lack of education, it cannot because the
market  does  not  exist. Under  the circumstances, one  can imagine  a situation  whereby
educational  inequalities  and  labor  market  failures interact to  create inequalities  in  the
returns to  investments in physical capital-whether  public or private.  Moreover,  lower
returns will be concentrated primarily among the poor, and poorly educated.
This paper tests the above argument.  The paper focuses on the case of irrigation
investments  in  rural  Vietnam.  Household  survey  data  are used  to  conduct  a  detailed
investigation of the marginal gains from irrigation and how they are affected by levels of
human capital and other household level factors. The paper asks: Do education levels raise
farm profits?  Through what  means?  Apart  from a  direct  effect,  does  education also
reinforce the effect of the key productive input of irrigation? Do returns to irrigation vary
between rich and poor households. And, if so, how much of the variation can be explained
by differences in education attainments? Do better educated households have higher gains
from physical infrastructure investments?
A recent analysis of the changes in poverty and inequality between the early and
late 1990s in Vietnam documents increasing inequality (Glewwe et al. 2000).  It also finds
that  the  returns  to  education have  increased  and  that  a  bigger  share  of  inequality  is
attributable to education disparities in the later period. A further aim of the present paper is
to search for the root of these changes in the situation of the early 1990s.  One possible
factor  could  be  differences  in  returns  to  investments  that  could  in  turn  lead  to  an
inequitable growth process.
A  vast  literature  exists  on  the returns  to  human  capital,  and  to  education  in
particular.  Links  have been  established between  education and numerous  outcomes-
including productivity (both market and non-market), wages and earnings, adoption of new
2technologies,  one's  own  health,  nutrition  and  fertility,  and  others',  including  one's
children's  health, nutrition,  fertility and  schooling (for an overview and references,  see
Strauss  and  Thomas  1995).  Much  attention has  been  devoted  to  complementarities
between different types of human capital.  For example, one issue has been how better
nutrition and health interact with schooling to create better educational outcomes.
Another  strand of research has studied the links between physical infrastructure,
productivity and household welfare (surveys can be found in Jimenez 1995, and Behrnan
1990).  Some of these studies focus on how infrastructure improves social indicators-for
example, how  safe water  supply  affects health  outcomes  or how  electricity can  have
positive impacts on education indicators through enabling children to study after daylight
hours.
The returns to education were long measured through wage or earnings regressions
with the focus naturally on labor market outcomes and, in poor rural settings, the non-farm
informal  sector.  Jamison  and  Lau  (1982)  were  among  the  first  to  focus  on  the
agriculturally self-employed and to identify non-wage effects of education on agricultural
productivity.  In  particular,  they  focused  on  the  effects  of  schooling  on  agricultural
efficiency.  Part of that effect was found to be transmitted through education's influence on
the choice of production techniques, such as through increasing the willingness to adopt
new technologies. Jamison and Lau estimate production functions that allow for interaction
effects  between  education  and  the  availability  of  extension  services,  and  find  some
evidence  that  agricultural  extension  enhances the  effect  of  education  on  agricultural
productivity.  They  do not  examine interactions between  education  and  other inputs,
however.
There  is  also  evidence that  education promotes  pro-poor  non-farm  economic
development.  In state-level time series data for India, Ravallion and Datt (1999) find that
states with initially higher rural literacy rates experienced more pro-poor growth processes,
notably in the non-farm sectors.
3In the context of this literature, the contribution of the present paper is to study the
interactions  between  the  returns  to  investment  and  education  and  other  household
characteristics, including demographics.  Does the type of interaction Jamison  and  Lau
(1982)  identify  between  education  and  extension  service  availability  also  hold  for
irrigation?  In  short,  are there  complementarities between human  capital  and  physical
capital?
Why should we care about these questions?  One can think of two reasons.  The
first has to do with a longstanding debate in development policy-the  case for and against
multi-sectoral  integrated  approaches  to  development  projects.  For  example,  should
traditional infrastructure projects be combined with education projects?  Should credit be
combined with education (as in the "non-lending" services supplied by some credit NGOs,
such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh)?  The second stems from the fact that we may be
concerned about distributional impacts.  Much evidence indicates that irrigation works are
often cornered by wealthier, larger farmers.  In most poor countries, such households will
also be better  educated.  If the returns to irrigation investments are indeed  enhanced by
education, inequality could be compounded and long-term pro-poor growth compromised,
without  complementary  targeted education interventions.  Finally,  under  this  scenario,
loosening credit market constraints will not be sufficient for ensuring equitable growth.
Section 2 gives an overview of the economic environment in rural Vietnam at the
time of data collection  in 1992/3 and a description of the data.  Section 3 describes the
hypothesis  to  be  tested  and  the  method,  whereby  farm  household  crop  incomes  are
modeled as functions of household and community characteristics. The results are found in
Section 4. An assessment is made of the determinants of the marginal returns to irrigated
land and the role of education. The final section concludes.
2.  Setting and Data
In 1988, Vietnam disbanded its agricultural cooperatives, re-instated family-based
production  and re-allocated land to  farm-households for long-term  use.  However,  land
4continued to be owned by the State, and hence, land markets to be illegal. The reforms
resulted in rising incomes for many rural households. However, regional disparities in the
speed  and  degree  of  market  penetration,  and  reductions  in  public  provisioning  and
financing of social services combined with increased reliance on household participation,
dampened average income gains in rural areas (Glewwe and Litvack 1998).
At  the  time  of  the  data  used  here,  1992/93, a  majority  of  rural  Vietnamese
households derived the bulk of their livelihoods from subsistence farming (van de Walle
2000). Opportunities for off-farm work were thin in most areas.  According to the 1992/3
Vietnam Living Standards Survey, unskilled wage work was available at some time during
the year in the communes of only 65 percent of the rural population, and varying from 50
percent of the poor to 74 percent of the non-poor. 2 A commercial enterprise was present
within ten kilometers of the communes of no more than 44 percent of households (40
percent of the poor, 50 of the non-poor).  Forty-six percent of households relied solely on
farming (48% in the North, 40% in the South, 50% of the poor and 40% of the non-poor);
20 percent combined farming with self-employment income; 19 percent  combined farm
and wage work, and 7 percent had all three sources of income.  In general, markets in the
South were more developed reflecting its different past.
Why has the rural labor market generally not worked better?  The answer appears to
be found in a combination of factors. The continuing legacy of the planned economy and a
historical emphasis on the ideal of the self-subsistence family farm play a part.  Poverty,
poor infrastructure, limited access to credit, a lack of mobility and geographical disparities
are other contributory factors. For example, these factors make it hard for a poor area to
attract skilled or educated workers and hire them.  They also prevent an efficient matching
of labor supply and demand.
The market reforms and freedom from the cooperatives appear to have had  little
effect  on  mobility.  Until  1986,  mobility  had  been  severely  restricted  through  the
2 The poor are those  with  household  per capita  expenditures  below  a poverty  line  determined  by the
cost-of-basic-needs  method  and detailed  in Dollar  and Glewwe  (1998).
5distribution  of  subsidies  for  essential  goods  being  tied  to  residency  (UJNDP 1998).
Although  the  subsidy  system  was  discontinued,  mobility  continued  de  facto  to  be
constrained by the fact that, together with access to  social services, major transactions,
such  as to  do with  land, housing, and  credit remained closely tied  to  one's  residency
permit. The difficulties entailed in establishing new residency, the poor state of transport
and communications  infrastructure, the absence of a land market,  and the decentralized
nature of the safety-net system all contributed to effectively discouraging mobility (van de
Walle  1999).  Typically,  a  rural  household's  only  risk-insurance  is  its  access  to  the
community-based  safety-net,  and  its  most  valuable non-labor  asset  is  its  landLwhose
continued  allocation  is  subject  to  residency.  These  facts  make  migration  a  risky
undertaking (UNDP 1998).3
There is a strong regional dimension to the above factors-poverty  varies across
provinces  and  districts  and  is  more pronounced  in  places  that  are more  remote  from
markets  and  cities  (Minot  1998). These same places  have  the  least non-farm  income
earning opportunities, the least developed infrastructure and generally poorer access and
quality of schooling.
Communism's  legacy  is  a  relatively  well  educated  and  healthy  population,
particularly in the North where public health and education efforts began.  much earlier. But
again,  there  are  important  regional  disparities  and  a  pronounced  correlation  between
education levels and poverty. Table  1 presents mean years of primary and post-primary
schooling for household heads and other household adult members by poverty status and
region.  The worse attainments and higher inequality in attainments in the South relative to
the North come out clearly. Regional inequalities in access to schooling and school inputs
and quality have been documented by many including World Bank (1999).
Irrigation and water control play a critical role in the production process in Vietnam
and the success of agriculture at the local level. In 1992/3, only 21 percent of the total land
' Similarly,  Jalan  and  Ravallion  (1999)  find  that  migration  is not  risk  reducing  in rural  China  (in
provinces  bordering  Vietnam).
6area was under cultivation and about half of that was irrigated (Vu and Taillard  1993).
Approximately the same percentage of agricultural annual crop land was irrigated.4 As in
other infrastructure areas, there had been negligible capital investment for decades and
existing  networks were  often not  functioning. Household annual  crop  land allocations
dated back to  1988 and had  changed little since. In the North,  assignments were made
according  to  household  size  or  labor  capacity,  and  allowing  for  land  heterogeneity
including quality and water access (Barker 1994). Allocations in the South were generally
less equitable, reverting largely to the pre-reunification status quo.
The  analysis  uses  the  country's  first  nationally  representative  household
consumption sample survey, theI992/3 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VNLSS). The
VNLSS gathers detailed information on consumption expenditures, incomes and  many
facets of living standards for 4800 households, of which 3840 are rural. There are modules
that focus on land assets, agricultural production and farm incomes. The VNLSS enforces a
broad definition of irrigation.  Land is recorded as irrigated if it benefits from a water
control system geared to  averting drought or excess flooding. The household  survey is
complemented by a comrnmunity  level questionnaire that collects details on socio-economic
characteristics  including  access  to  social  and  physical  infrastructure  facilities  for  all
communes in which surveyed households reside. By the standards of household surveys in
poor countries, the VNLSS is considered of high quality. 5
Real  household  consumption  expenditures per  capita are  used  as  the  welfare
indicator. The deflator is the ratio of region specific poverty lines to the national poverty
line.
4 In addition to annual crop land, households derive agricultural  incomes from perennial land (tree crops),
forest land, water surface  land (for raising water products) and 'other land': vacant lots and bald hills (managed
by the household but not cultivated for at least a year); burnt and fallow land, road, dike, and river banks, etc.
The paper focuses on annual crop land.
A detailed description of the survey questionnaires  and data is given in Glewwe (1994).
73.  Determinants of Crop Incomes in Vietnam
3.1  The Hypothesis to be Tested
In a world of perfect  markets,  marginal  products  of capital  will be equalized  across
all farm-households. In equilibrium, the net gain to farm profits from investing in
irrigation  (marginal  value product of irrigating  unirrigated  land minus rental price of the
capital  inputs)  will have been driven down  to zero for all farm-households.  This no longer
holds with capital  market imperfections,  such that the fann-household  is constrained  by its
current  capital  stock. The net gains  from investment  will then  vary.
Suppose also that investments  require knowledge inputs that raise the marginal
product of capital.  If the farm-household  is similarly  constrained  in its ability to hire these
knowledge  inputs then the higher its existing stock of knowledge,  the higher will be the
marginal gains to the  farm-household  from relaxing the constraint on  its investment
opportunities.  The knowledge-poor  will have lower  returns  from investment  in irrigation.
Suppose  that, in addition  to these assumptions,  richer households  are better able to
cover the costs of acquiring  knowledge  by sending  their children to school, for example.
The rich households  may not have any better  access  to credit  for this purpose,  but they can
substitute  their  higher personal  wealth.
Together  these assumptions  imply that the poorer a farm-household  is, the lower
will be the rate of return  it can expect  from a given investment  in irrigation,  or any similar
type of farm capital. The key testable implication of this hypothesis is found in how
irrigation influences living standards in rural Vietnam, and how education and other
variables influence  that relationship. In particular,  the paper aims to test for interaction
effects between irrigation investment and human capital endowments  at the household
level.
83.2  The Method of Testing
To test the above  hypothesis,  the paper  examines  the determinants  of net farm  crop
income.  The size of the difference  in marginal  returns  between irrigated  and non-irrigated
land determines the income gains from irrigating a unit of land.  The profit function
Ir( p,  LN, L', z)  gives the farm-household's  maximum  profit conditional  on a vector  of
prices  ( p ), amounts  of non-irrigated  ( LN) and irrigated  (L') annual  crop land,  and a vector
of other fixed factors (z).  A wide range of variables are included in  z  to  allow for
constraints  arising  from  market  imperfections.
Profit  is measured  by farm  crop income,  net of variable  costs. 6 For the jt household,
the profit function  is assumed  to be:
(1)  ,z  lfj(p(dj),  Li,  LJ, zj)=a  +  LJ + 83LJ + rzj  + gdj  + ej
where (to allow interaction  effects such that the marginal  returns to irrigation  vary across
households):
(2)  JB± b'o  +b di +bb2z  j+b3  Lj
and
f(3)  /j =  bO+  bi'dj  +b'2zj  +  b,U
The error term in (1) is assumed  to be independently  and identically  normally  distributed.
The regression  includes  a full set of commune  dummy  variables  (d in equation 1) that will
pick up prices, spatial, cross-commune  variations  in other omitted  or fixed factors  such as
6 Total  revenue  from agricultural  production  includes  all crops  evaluated  at harvest  prices  (missing
values are replaced  by average  community  prices);  the value  of crop  byproducts  consumed  or sold; land
incomes  and income  from leasing  out  farm  production  equipment.  Total  production  costs are subtracted.
These include costs of hired labor, seeds and young plants, fertilizer, manure, insecticide, animal rental,
transport, packaging and storage, equipment rental, repair and maintenance fees, fuel oil and electricity, an
accounting depreciation charge for owned farming equipment (5%), land and other taxes and fees to
cooperative or government. Transformation of home grown crops or livestock income are not included. The
costs of household labor inputs on the family farm are also omitted. This is defensible if one is concemed
solely with the impact of irrigation on family consumption (since the implicit payment for own-labor inputs
is exactly matched by the receipts leaving consumption unchanged).
9soil and schooling quality, and community level characteristics, including geographical and
infrastructure  variations.  Prices  are  thus  assumed  to  vary  between  but  not  within
communes. These spatial effects are compressed into seven regional entities in their effects
on marginal returns (d  in equations 2 and 3).
Household level explanatory variables contained in z include household size and
composition; gender of the household head; years of primary school education (O  to 5) and
of any additional education of the household head; the same for other adult household
members (aged over 17);7  access to other types of agricultural land; 8 proportions of annual
crop land in various forms of ownership; 9 the stock of savings, and dummy variables for
urban residence  and a  household member's  illness in  the last year.'" Table 2 provides
variable descriptions and summary statistics.
As discussed in Section 2, land is not allocated by a market mechanism in Vietnam.
Given virtually static land allocations since 1988 and negligible mobility, concerns about
regressing outputs on inputs chosen by the household (and hence endogenous) do not arise
in this  setting with  respect to  land. The existence of irrigation in  an  area can also be
reasonably treated as exogenous at the household level given that land allocation is pre-
deternined and the nature of irrigation technology entails that a single farmer will rarely be
able  to  undertake  the investment  required  on his  own. The  fact  that  there  has  been
negligible expansion in irrigation since 1988 reinforces this argument.
7The education  of school  age children  is omitted  to avoid  possible  endogeneity  problems.  The latter  could
result  if, households  with  unobserved  factors  contributing  to  higher  farm  profits  are more  likely  to pull  children
out  of school.
See footnote 4.
9 It may  be important  to distinguish  between  land  ownership  rights.  In the survey  (pre-the  new land  law of
late 1993)  land  is defined  as one  of 5 types:  i) Allocated:  (North  only)  land  from  the cooperative's  fund,
distributed  according  to number  of household  workers.  ii)  Auctioned:  (North)  5-10  % of the cooperative's  land,
reserved  for  bidding  by households,  more  expensive,  with  a 3 to 5 year  tenure  depending  on the region.  iii)
Long  term  use:  the South's  equivalent  of allocated  land.  iv) Private:  used  by households  as a garden  area,  often
of lower  quality,  required  no payment.  v) Sharecropped  or rented.
'° In addition,  dummy  variables  for  the household  head's  ethnicity,  age,  religion,  language,  and  whether
bom  in present  residence  were  found  to be insignificant  and  to have  no effect  on  the other  regression
coefficients.
10Omitted variable bias is a potential concern, however.  The commune level dummy
variables  will  pick  up  omitted between-commune, but  not  omitted within  commune
variance-such  as in land or  soil quality. If,  for example, better parcels  of land have
already been irrigated, the regressions will overestimate the returns to expanding irrigation
to the remaining parcels.  To test for this possibility, the regressions were estimated with
crop  land entered  separately as irrigated land of poor, medium  and  good  quality  and
similarly for non-irrigated land.  These variables were insignificant and no signs of bias
due to differences in land quality, at least as measured in the survey, were fournd.  Annual
crop land is thus entered simply as irrigated and non-irrigated land.  Omitted variable bias
could be more of a problem in the South, where salinity and acidity problems are common
for irrigated land in the Mekong delta, though not identified in the survey.
Given  the  education  system's  high  degree  of  decentralization  to  the  local
(commune) level, education quality is likely to vary across communes but much less so
within communes.  Variations should thus be  captured by  the  commune dummies.  A
further potential source of bias is if years of education are highly correlated with innate
ability or family background, and thus proxy for unobserved endowments. The latter could
then determine how many years are spent in school but also labor productivity. Inability to
control for innate ability is a common problem in estimating education impacts.  However,
there is too much variance in both the access to schooling and its quality in Vietnam for
this  to be  a plausible  and complete explanation for the results discussed below.  Given
existing  spatial differences in access, many perfectly able people will not benefit  from
schooling. Thus, as a result of supply side factors, it can be argued that years of education
are unlikely to be well correlated with ability.
OLS is used on the samnple  of 3049 farn-households  (including some urban farn-
households) surveyed in the VNLSS, as described in Section 2, and for which the data are
complete.
114.  Results
4.1  The Regressions
Table 3 reports results for two regressions:  the 'unrestricted  model' contains all
variables, while the 'restricted' model is the outcome  of pruning variables  with t-ratios
below 1 in the unrestricted  model and following  iterations. In an effort to make Table 3
more compact, variables with t-ratios below 1 and the  commune dummies are  not
reported." Table  4 presents  the calculated  total marginal  effects  and t-statistics  of variables
that enter the regression  interacted  with other variables,  evaluated  at mean points. Annual
land,  both irrigated  and non-irrigated,  and perennial  land all have high significant  positive
overall  effects  on crop income.  The impact  of irrigated  land is more than twice as large as
that of non-irrigated  land. There are also high returns to perennial  land. Returns  to other
land types are lower and only water surface in  the restricted model is  statistically
significant.
Education  variables  are found  to have pronounced  and significant  positive impacts
on crop income.  In particular, one extra year of primary education for the head of
household  increases  crop income  by an amount  equal to about eight percent of mean crop
income.  There  are decreasing  returns  to the education  of the household  head, but not  to that
of other members.  There is clearly  no sign  here that the returns  to education  are primarily
captured  through  non-farm  activities. Finally,  larger households  have higher  crop incomes.
This implies that family labor endowments  matter in agricultural  production probably
because labor  markets are  underdeveloped. The  marginal effects of  demographic
composition  variables  are  not statistically  significant.
The regression  shows strong, though diminishing,  impacts of annual crop land-
both irrigated and non-irrigated--on crop income (Table 3). Household size matters,
though composition  effects are not of consequence  independently  of the interaction  with
land.  Many of the interaction  effects  are significant  and of interest.  For example,  household
size appears  important  in its interactions  with nearly  all land  variables  (all are significant  in
12the restricted model), as does the share of female adults. These effects are mostly positive
and demonstrate the importance of family labor inputs, and particularly female ones.' 2
They  suggest  a  dependency  on  own  household  labor,  and  point  to  labor  market
imperfections and the inability of many households to hire labor in or out.
In contrast, interacting size and the female adult share with irrigated land, and the
female adult  share  with  non-irrigated land, results  in  a  negative impact.  A plausible
interpretation seems to be that the market labor constraint does not bite as much for large
irrigated holdings  in the South. This fact drives the overall result. When the sample is
partitioned across regions, the negative effect holds only in the South, and particularly in
the Mekong delta (though it is clearly strong enough to influence estimation results for the
national  model).  For  households with  larger  amounts  of  irrigated land,  family  labor
becomes less of a constraint. It is the way in which household labor influences crop income
that is important here.  If households could buy or sell as much labor time as required then
one  would  not  expect  household demographics to  be  significant in  the  crop  income
equation. The fact that they are significant can then be taken as an implication of labor
market failure. Family labor becomes an input to production but the extent to which this
matters depends on how much market conditions apply to each household.  The results
indicate that family labor is generally a constraining factor in farm production in the North,
but less so in the South and particularly less so for households with lots of irrigated land in
the Mekong delta.' 3 A test of the linear restriction that the overall influence of household
size is zero when evaluated at mean sample values is not rejected for the South (though the
number is positive), but is found to be positive and significant in the North. (The same is
1 Full  regression  details  are available  from  the author.
Women  play  a major  role in agriculture  in Vietnam.  The  VNLSS  indicates  that  women  averaged  the
equivalent  of 182.5  eight  hour  days  a year on  the family  farm  and  men 159.4  days.
13 A number  of factors  lend  support  to this  interpretation.  Commune  level  wage  data  show  that  labor
markets  are better  developed  in the  South.  Both  agricultural  and  unskilled  non-agricultural  wages  are  missing
for a larger  share  of households  in the North  than  in  the South.  Salinger  (1993)  corroborates  the underdeveloped
state  of labor  markets  in  North  relative  to South  Vietnam.  More  so  than elsewhere,  the Mekong  delta  has large
fully  irrigated  or unirrigated  areas.  van  de Walle  (1996)  finds  that  irrigation  increases  labor  input  requirements.
It may  be surmised  that  labor  markets  are likely  to  have  better  developed  in areas  of the Mekong  with  large
irrigated  farms.
13found for the female share.)  Thus, the importance of the labor market constraint varies
across households and from region to region.
Education is found to be of considerable importance to agricultural productivity.
The primary schooling of the household head is important on its own and convex in its
impact on crop  incomes, implying increasing returns to  schooling.  Interaction  effects
between education variables  and  land are generally positive.  Interestingly, the results
imply that primary education interacts strongly with irrigated land to increase crop income
while post-primary education does not.
Many of the 119 commune dummies are significant at the 5% significance level.
There are also non-negligible spatial differences in the effects of both irrigated and non-
irrigated land, and other land types.  These effects are relative to land impacts  on crop
incomes  in  the  South East  (left out  of the regression)  and  show  expected signs  and
magnitudes.
4.2  Explaining the Marginal Returns to Irrigation
The regression results provide evidence of important synergies between household
education and the returns to irrigation. A natural question is how much larger the effect of
irrigation on crop incomes could be if education levels were higher?
The  marginal  effects  on  crop  income  of  irrigated  and  non-irrigated  land  are
calculated  and presented  in  Table  5 under  three education scenarios:  i)  all  education
variables are increased by one standard deviation of their value; ii) all primary education is
increased (to 5 full years for the household head and by one standard deviation for all other
adults); and iii) the household head's primary education is set to the maximum five years.
The resulting net impacts can be compared to irrigation's baseline net marginal effect on
crop income. Land's marginal effect is increased in all three cases, as is the net effect of
irrigated land. The largest impact-a  36% boost in the net baseline effect-is  achieved
through increasing the primary schooling of all adults. Primary school completion for all
heads results in a  10% increase, while an increase in  all adults'  education levels brings
14about a 19% increase in the baseline. Increased education influences the returns to both
non-irrigated and irrigated land, but it has a larger relative effect on the latter.
The distribution  of gains  from an expansion of irrigation infrastructure, holding
total  cultivated  land constant, will be  determined by  a number  of  factors. Clearly, the
existing distribution  of irrigated and non-irrigated land across households together  with
how the expansion is allocated  across farms will play a key role. However,  the above
results on the determinants of crop incomes suggest that the influence of other household
and community specific factors that enter the marginal benefit of irrigation function may
also be considerable. That is the focus here.
The marginal gain from irrigating a unit of land is given by  ,3I _fiN1 +  b3  LI-
bN3 LNj  i.e., the difference between the derivatives with respect to irrigated and non-
irrigated land, estimated using the parameter estimates in Table 3 applied to the household-
specific values of the relevant variables.  This will be called the marginal benefit function.
The marginal benefit function thus shows the effect of each characteristic on the net marginal
benefit of irrigation. It is given in Table 6, as evaluated at mean variable values. Of primary
interest here are the strong and significant effects of the level of primary education on the
marginal benefit from irrigation. This is true both of the head and other adult members of the
household. Higher levels of education appear of much less consequence. The large, negative
and significant impact of household size is also of note.  Holding other factors constant,
households best positioned to  achieve the highest benefit from irrigation investments are
those who have high levels of primary schooling and smaller household size. As one would
expect, there are also some strong regional effects.
The mean net marginal benefit is 329 Dongs per year per square meter.' 4 But, there is
variation both across regions and the expenditure  distribution. Figure 1 provides a scatter plot
of the household level figures against per capita expenditures for the national sample, and for
'4  This differs from the baseline in table 5 because it excludes negative marginal benefits of irrigation
found for some farms in the Mekong delta with large plots. This could be a problem with the model's
performance in the South but it could also be that these farms are overirrigated. The paper now focuses on
cases where retums to irrigation are positive.
15North  and  South Vietnam  separately. It  also  gives  the line  of  best  fit estimated  non-
parametrically. It can be seen that the marginal benefits have a tendency to increase with the
welfare indicator. This pattern is somewhat more pronounced when the national picture is
disaggregated into South and North.  However, the gains are clearly progressivedAeclining
as a share of the welfare indicator.
In estimating the marginal benefit of irrigating one unit of non-irrigated land, all
household  characteristics other than the amount of irrigated land are held  constant and
fixed at the mean of all variables. However, if other variables changed simultaneously, the
marginal benefit of irrigation would also shift. As we have seen, education is found to be
an important factor. As a policy variable, it is also of particular interest. The regression
model's  results  suggest that the impact of an  expansion of irrigation will be higher  for
households with greater human capital. Given the tendency for the total years of household
education  to  be  greater  for  higher  expenditure  groups  in  Vietnam  as  well  as  in  the
country's  North, distributional and regional impacts can also be expected. The degree to
which  an  extra quantity  of  education will shift  irrigation benefits  at the  mean  can be
assessed using  the marginal benefit  function. It  can help examine how much education
levels contribute to differences in marginal benefits, and how much of the variation across
households is explained by differences in education versus differences in other factors.
To explore these issues the paper asks how much the gains would vary if there were
no differences in the education levels of adults across households.  Marginal benefits are
assessed under two policy simulations: 1) every household head has the maximum five years
of primary education and 2) all adults complete primary schooling. Figure 2 gives a non-
parametric assessment  of the  simulated and baseline  household  level  marginal benefits
plotted against per capita expenditures. The comparison of the  gains  at actual levels  of
education with the simulated amounts that would result if each household  head had  the
maximum five years  of primary education, or if  all adults also had the  five full years,
clearly shows how markedly education levels can raise the returns  to irrigation. This  is
evident  along most of  the expenditure distribution,  though the impact is largest for the
16poorest and largely disappears for the richest. The results are most striking for the South,
but the picture for the North is qualitatively similar.
Simulation 1 implies an average increase of only 0.43 years of education in the North
and 0.82 in the South. Simulation 2 would require 2.53 and 3.87 additional school years in
the North and South respectively. Under both policy simulations, extra education tends to go
to the poor.  Additional years of education therefore tend to equalize the marginal benefit
conditional on expenditures. Despite policy 1 requiring a smaller increase in years of primary
education on average, it achieves a greater response in the marginal benefits than policy 2.
The elasticity of the marginal benefit of irrigation with respect to primary education is on
average nearly two and a half times higher for a primary school completion policy targeted to
household heads. The  elasticities are also higher in  the South, as  are the proportionate
increases in marginal benefits. This reflects the fact that education levels in the South are
both lower and less equal than elsewhere in Vietnam.
The results thus suggest that a policy of primary education targeted to  adults in
Vietnam would have a substantial equalizing effect through its impact on the returns to
irrigation  investments.  Conversely,  the  evidence  supports  the  view  that  because  of
complementarities  between  education  and  investments  in  irrigation,  the  presence  of
inequalities in education that are correlated with levels of living result in lower returns to
irrigation for the poor.
5.  Conclusions
In  modeling  the  determinants  of  crop  incomes,  the  above  analysis  uncovers
evidence of  strong  complementarities between  the returns  to  irrigation  and  household
education, particularly primary education in rural Vietnam.  Simulated effects of increased
education  indicate  that  gains  would  accrue  primarily  to  the  poor  and  have  a  strong
equalizing effect on the returns to irrigation investment. Demographics are also found to be
important reflecting labor market imperfections. If one could buy and sell household level
17skills, these results would not be found in the data. This explains why the household stock
of skills and education and its size and composition influence farm profits.
Lack  of irrigation infrastructure is clearly only  one constraint  to  reducing  rural
poverty in Vietnam.  The quantity (in particular household size) and quality (education) of
the family's human resources also matter. The full returns to irrigation will not be realized
by the poor without concomitant investments in education.  The functioning  of markets
will also have to be improved. Finally, one can conjecture that the current lack of other
infrastructure such as roads, electricity, communications and so forth, must also conspire to
reduce the impacts that can be garnered from irrigation alone. The paper's  results enhance
the case for multi-sectoral approaches for development projects generally.
These findings  have implications  for Vietnam's  future rural development.  The
results suggest that the poor, and poorly educated, will obtain systematically lower returns
to  investment  given current  circumstances. These  circumstances  include  disparities  in
educational  attainments  that  are  correlated  with  poverty,  the  existence  of  important
synergies between human and physical capital, and missing  or poorly performing  labor
markets.  In such a situation, the knowledge-poor will have lower returns to investment and
they will also be  income poor.  As capital markets develop, resources  will flow to  the
higher returns. So one  can expect the transition to a market economy in Vietnam  to be
inequality increasing unless the inequalities in education are redressed or markets for skills
are somehow made to perform better.
Do  the paper's  results  imply that  governments  should  only  invest  in  irrigation
infrastructure in high  education-and  likely wealthier-areas?  Two arguments question
that conclusion.  First, governments are in the business of providing education.  The fact
that there are differences across groups implies a market failure that the government needs
to correct.  The second reason is that the areas with higher schooling attainments will be
better  positioned to engage in  cooperative arrangements and privately provide  for their
water  management  needs.  It  is  in  the  low  education  areas that  the  case  for  public
intervention may be most compelling.
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20Table 1: Adult education attainments in North and South Vietnam by poverty status in mean years
(standard errors in parentheses)
North  South
Poor  Non-poor  Poor  Non-poor
Head's years of primary education  4.52  4.55  3.88  4.03
(.03)  (.03)  (.07)  (.06)
Other adults' years of primary  2.72  3.43  0.95  1.49
education  (.07)  (.12)  (.09)  (.11)
Head's years beyond primary  6.31  7.25  6.20  8.33
(.13)  (.18)  (.31)  (.28)
Other adults' years beyond primary  3.80  5.61  1.86  4.04
(.12)  (.22)  (.20)  (.26)
21Table  2: Variable  definitions  and summary  data
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std.  Dev.
crop  income  Net  yearly  household  crop  income,  1993  Dongs  2,282,069  2,391,173
sick  Dummny  for  household  member  being  sick  in  last year  0.933  0.250
gender  Gender  of household  head  0.809  0.393
hhsvgs  Initial  stock  of household  savings,  1993  Dongs  939,223  8,990,056
size  Size  of the household  5.033  1.992
propO6  Proportion  of household  memrbers  who  are 6  years  and  young  0.156  0.176
prop716  Proportion  of  h'hold members  who are  7 to 16  years,  inclusive  0.213  0.204
pfadlt  Proportion  of household  members  who  are female  adults  (17  +)  0.327  0.169
pmadlt  Proportion  of  household  members  that  are male  adults  (17  +)  0.282  6.160
hedl  Years  of primary  education  of household  head  4.379  1.114
hed2  Years  of post-primary  education  of household  head  2.513  2.842
oedl  Years  of primary  education  of other  adult  h'hold  members  (17  +)  6.872  5.372
oed2  Years  of post-primary  education  of other  adult  members  (17  +)  4.111  5.287
irrigated  Irrigated  annual  crop  land  area  (m 2)  2,267.58  3,997.50
nonirrigated  Non-irrigated  annual  crop  lanid  area (mn 2)  2,605.92  5,632.34
perenmial  Perennial land area (in 2)  678.43  2,169.50
forest  Forest land area (m 2)  279.22  1,970.98
waterland  Water surface land area (in
2)  122.89  1,203.53
otherland  Other land area (n2)  217.50  2,106.11
long  term  Proportion  of annual  land  which  is long-term  0.20  0.380
auction  Proportion  of annual  land  which  is auctioned  0.023  0.092
private  Proportion  of annual  land  which  is private  0.227  0.341
sharecrop  Proportion  of annual  land  which  is sharecropped/rented  0.043  0.165
allocated  Proportion  of annual  land  which  is allocated  0.507  0.431
urban  Dummy  variable  for urban  residence  0.057  0.231
nu  Dummny  variable  for the  Northem  Uplands  region  0.183  0.387
rr  Dummy  variable  for  the Red  River  Delta  region  0.275  0.447
nc  Dummy  variable  for  the North  Coast  region  0.178  0.383
cc  Dummy  vanable  for  the Central  Coast  region  0.090  0.286
ch  Dummy  variable  for  the Central  Highlands  region  0.020  0.139
ink  Dummy  variable  for  the Mekong  River  Delta  region  0.20  0.40
22Table 3: Crop  Income Regressions
Unrestricted  Model  Restricted  Model
Crop  income  Coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio
urban  1,093,640  1.08  83,7371  1.25
sick  -31,8465.4  2.59  -317,534.3  2.61
size  81,451.7  2.12  67,405.6  2.61
propO6  -586,514.9  1.18  -42,9757.1  2.08
hedl  -468,646.3  2.69  -52,7229.5  3.12
hedl*hedl  67,862.6  2.66  76,644.0  3.13
oedl*oedl  -1,932.7  2.48  -1,566.7  3.22
oed2  21,023.8  1.24  27,026.3  2.85
irrigated  352.40  4.27  362.59  4.78
irr*irr  -0.0030  4.42  -0.0030  4.82
noDirrigated  238.40  3.81  206.72  8.20
nonirrig*nonirrig  -0.0036  9.60  -0.0034  10.63
perennial  -277.04  1.73  -238.17  2.11
perennial*perennial  -0.0097  6.43  -0.0099  7.10
forest  -372.88  1.35  -80.33  1.02
forest*forest  -0.0026  1.38  -0.0022  2.0
waterland*waterland  -0.0401  3.80  -0.0042  5.12
otherland  -611.27  1.22  -426.07  2.16
otherland*otherland  -0.0024  1.32  -0.0016  1.19
auction  1,116,555  2.54  1,048,419  2.62
private  325,505.5  1.49  215,568  1.50
allocated  470,198.4  2.10  337,486.1  2.07
hedl*irrigated  47.87  6.06  49.80  6.93
hedl*otherland  -113.39  2.58  -111.97  3.40
hed2*irrigated  -6.46  1.53  -5.10  1.46
hed2*perennial  21.90  2.53  25.85  4.09
hed2*forest  23.01  1.62  26.73  3.23
hed2*waterland  72.61  1.58  30.70  2.12
hed2*otherland  33.45  1.51  22.67  1.14
oedl*irrigated  20.74  8.03  20.74  8.58
oedl*nonirrigated  7.27  3.38  5.66  3.51
oedl*perennial  5.42  1.21  5.10  1.20
oedl*forest  -21.37  1.72  -12.80  3.20
oedl*otherland  -49.20  4.66  -39.95  4.48
oed2*irrigated  -4.179  2.18  -4.57  2.52
oed2*nonirrigated  1.741  1.04  1.990  1.34
oed2*perennial  -10.914  2.65  -10.694  2.76
oed2*otherland  33.814  4.0  25.259  3.60
size*irrigated  -35.991  6.94  -35.865  7.51
size*nonirrigated  4.639  1.13.  7.243  2.22
size*perennial  52.933  4.62  51.712  4.79
sizefforest  37.473  1.68  28.892  2.38
size*otherland  79.081  2.62  64.675  2.28
pfadlt*irrigated  -176.63  2.16  -189.17  2.55
pfadlt*nonirrigated  -137.02  2.07  -115.10  2.30
pfadlt*perennial  610.10  3.33  628.69  4.12
23Unrestricted  Model  Restricted  Model
pmadlt*irrigated  -162.40  1.71  -142.17  1.70
pmadlt*perennial  289.39  1.92  290.70  2.63
prop7l6*irrigated  155.85  2.03  132.86  1.94
rr*irligated  271.75  4.06  260.97  4.17
rr*forest  135.35  1.03  74.85  1.19
mk*irrigated  -67.71  1.94  -83.64  2.65
mk*perennial  -158.92  2.94  -147.73  2.95
nu*irrigated  255.81  3.47  241.34  3.43
nu*perennial  -199.58  2.27  -215.25  2.77
nu*otherland  434.86  1.20  361.41  5.02
nc*perennial  -218.53  3.02  -205.53  2.96
nc*otherland  528.01  1.39  480.14  3.09
cc*irrigated  -203.38  3.63  -211.93  3.97
cc*noniffigated  -152.25  2.62  -147.69  3.03
cc*perennial  -228.68  1.26  -226.31  1.26
ch*irligated  -973.79  1.66  -1,051.07  1.81
ch*nonirrigated  -134.37  2.65  -130.90  3.29
ch*perennial  310.57  4.37  326.09  4.96
ch*waterland  5,195.78  1.31  4,078.46  2.70
Number  of obs = 3049  Number  of obs = 3049
F(233, 2815) =  19.06  F(183, 2865) = 24.04
Prob > F =0.0000  Prob > F =0.0000
R-square  =  0.6120  R-square  =  0.6057
Adj R-sqaare = 0.5799  Adj R-square = 0.5805
Root MSE =1.5e+06  Root MSE = 1.5e+06
Note: The restricted  model results from the pruning of all variables  with t-ratios less than 1 in the unrestricted  model.  The
unrestricted  model also contained  the following  variables:  demographic  composition  variables,  pnum716, pfadlt, pmadlt and
interactions  with land variables; education  variables: hed2, hed2 2,  oedl, oed2 2 and interactions  with land; land: waterland
and interactions  between  types of land and regions;  long term, sharecrop.
24Table 4: Marginal  Effect on Net Crop Income  Allowing  for Interaction  Effects
Unrestricted  model  Restricted  Model
Marginal  effect
Marginal  effect  on  on net crop
Variable  net crop income  t-ratio  income  t-ratio
Irrigated annual  land  Dongs/m 2 485.7  16.1  482.3  17.9
Non-irrigated  annual  land  Dongs/m 2 199.9  8.1  218.8  16.3
Perennial  land  Dongs/m 2 212.7  4.1  233.9  6.7
Forest land  Dongs/m 2 87.2  1.9  63.3  1.8
Water surface land  Dongs/m 2 -864.9  0.1  157.3  3.3
Other land  Dongs/m 2 104.2  1.2  23.5  0.4
Household  size  Dongs/person  59,065.9  2.0  62,154.9  2.8
Prop female  adults  Dongs/%  point  -2,366.5  0.1  78,456.6  0.4
Prop male adults  Dongs/%  point  -1,165.1  0.2  -125,228.9  0.6
Prop aged 7-16  Dongs/%  point  1,041.6  0.2  301,322.2  1.9
Primary ed (head)  Dongs/year  191,875.8  3.0  232,762.7  4.1
Ed > primary (head)  Dongs/year  38,584.9  2.0  22,132.4  2.3
Primary ed (other  adults)  Dongs/year  35,094.1  2.5  31,466.8  4.7
Ed>  primry  (other  adults)  Dongs/year  22,195.7  1.8  20,094.3  2.6
Mean yearly crop income  2,282,069  2,282,069
Note:  Marginal  effects  are evaluated  at mean  points.
25Table 5: Complementarities Between Land, Irrigation, and Education
Marginal effect of  Marginal effect of  Net marginal effect
irrigated  land on  non-irrigated land  of irrigation on crop
Education scenario  crop income  on crop income  income
Baseline  485.7  199.9  285.8
All education levels increased (+ sd)  586.3  244.9  341.4
All primary education increased (+ sd)  627.0  239.4  387.6
Primary education of household heads
is full 5 years  515.4  200.3  315.1
Note: Primary  education  of household  head is  increased  to maximum  possible  primary  education:  5 years.  Other  increases  are
equal  to I standard  deviation  of specific  variable.  These  results  are based  on the unrestricted  model.
Table 6: Marginal Benefit Function from Irrigation
Variable  Effect on marginal benefit  t-ratio
Intercept  114.0  1.24
Irrigated land  -0.006  4.42
Non-irrigated land  0.0072  9.60
Household head primary  47.87  5.56
education
Household head other education  -5.131  1.07
Other adult primary education  13.472  4.69
Other adult other education  -5.92  2.57
Household size  -40.63  7.04
Proportion of female adults  -39.61  0.44
Proportion of male adults  -100.14  1.00
Proportion of children 7 to 16  148.1  1.94
Red River  315.81  3.05
Mekong Delta  -72.08  3.44
Northem Uplands  274.64  1.63
North Coast  98.67  1.14
Central Coast  -51.13  0.75
Central Highlands  -839.42  1.41
Note: Each  number  represents  the effect  of that  variable  (evaluated  at the mean  value)  on the marginal  benefit  of irrigating  one unit
of non-irrigated  land.  These  results  are based  on the unrestricted  model.
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Figure  1. Marginal  Benefits  by Area
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